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Abstract
Forensic analysis commonly involves searching an investigation target for personal identifiable information. An
Inland Revenue Department (IRD) number is used for taxation purposes in New Zealand and can provide
evidence of perpetrator identity, transaction information or electronic fraud. This research has designed and
implemented a bulk_extractor feature scanner to detect and validate IRD numbers (features). The IRD scanner
has been tested on a known data set to ensure tool functionality. A large real world data set was then used to
determine scanner effectiveness in a realistic investigation scenario. Real world data set testing highlighted a
high number of unrelated features detected by the scanner. To combat this, a novel post-processing technique
was implemented to identify forensically interesting IRD numbers by performing feature context searching. The
post-processing findings proved that feature context searching is an effective data reduction technique that
identified a low number of directly relevant IRD numbers.
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INTRODUCTION
The size of digital investigation targets continues to grow at an exponential rate due to increased digital storage
capacity and the number of devices seized per case (Quick & Choo, 2014). Furthermore, the complexity of digital
investigations is also escalating caused by the proliferation of operating systems and file formats (Garfinkel,
2010). As a consequence, advanced forensic analysis techniques are required to combat these digital investigation
challenges.
A common forensic analysis task is to search digital media for Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The
United States (U.S.) Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines PII as any personal information that can
be used to locate, link or identify an individual (GAO, 2008). Examples include names, aliases, Social Security
Number, passport number, driver’s license number, taxpayer identification number, credit card number and email
addresses (McCallister, Grance and Scarfone, 2010).
A person’s taxpayer identification number is an important personal identifier which is used for general tax
purposes. The identification of taxpayer information is useful in digital investigations to determine perpetrator
identification, attribution of financial information or potential electronic fraud. In New Zealand, taxpayer
identification is controlled by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) in the form of an IRD number: a unique 8 or
9 digit number. An IRD number is also used for Goods and Services Tax (GST), a tax implemented on most
products sold and/or services rendered in New Zealand. Australia has a similar tax number system where each
person has a Tax File Number (TFN) issued by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), while the U.S. equivalent
is the Social Security Number (SSN).
Previous Research
Forensic analysis commonly involves performing text-based string searching to identify PII. Digital forensic
string searching analyses each byte of digital evidence, at the physical level, to locate specific text strings of
interest to an investigation (Beebe & Clark, 2007). Take the case of an electronic fraud investigation; potentially
interesting searches may include credit card numbers, bank account numbers and tax identification numbers.
Research projects in the past have investigated, designed and evaluated a variety of forensic analysis techniques
and tools to retrieve such information.
“An examiner can use the UNIX utilities strings and grep to perform keyword searches … strings will
print the human-readable ASCII text it finds in a given input file, and grep will search through an input file or
stream for a string matching a user-supplied regular expression or string” (Altheide, 2004). The Sleuth Kit (TSK)
includes the Windows compatible srch_strings program, a modified version of the strings command
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found in the GNU binutils package (Altheide & Carvey, 2011). The Identity Finder tool from Cornell
University has the ability to scan hard drives, web sites and collections of files to identify social security, credit
card and bank account numbers (Cornell University, 2014). Popular forensic tool kits have built-in functionality
to identify common PII artifacts. EnCase Forensic has built-in functionality to search for credit card numbers,
phone numbers, email addresses and social security numbers (Guidance Software, 2011).
Garfinkel (2006) authored a program that scans media for credit card numbers (with different delimiters) and
validates the output with the Luhn algorithm and a variety of other validation checks; for example, no major
credit card number begins with the number eight. This was achieved by developing a variety of feature extractors
to extract potentially interesting information including SSNs, email information and credit card numbers.
Garfinkel (2013) continued this development resulting in the bulk_extractor tool; a stream forensic tool that
reads the entire target media from start to end without performing disk seeking. The bulk_extractor tool
contains a wide variety of feature extractors, or scanners, which search and extract a variety of PII information
such as credit card numbers, telephone numbers and email addresses.
The dilemma is that the discussed techniques and tools have limited usefulness as the resultant search hits are
only identified based on the structure of the string being searched. A credit card number, for example, is usually
stored in the following structure; NNNN-NNNN-NNNN-NNNN, four octets of four numbers. However, not all
number combinations in this structure may be a valid credit card number. Thus, PII numbers usually have
validation algorithms that can verify a value, such as the Luhn algorithm (Garfinkel, 2006).
Research Problem
Previous research surrounding forensic analysis of PII has primarily been designed for U.S. based information.
There exists a need for verified techniques and tools to detect and validate PII from other countries. In New
Zealand, IRD numbers can aid digital investigations involving financial information and attribution. Currently,
there are no viable solutions available to detect and validate IRD numbers. This leads to practitioners having to
develop their own tools that lack testing and verification. Implementation of techniques and tools must
demonstrate design and evaluation to ensure that the resultant system produces reliable and credible results to aid
forensic analysis.
Paper Structure
The aim of this paper is to present the design and implementation of a bulk_extractor scanner plug-in to
detect and validate IRD numbers and a stoplist to filter irrelevant results. Experimental testing is conducted on a
known data set to determine the functionality and capability of the implemented design. A selection of real world
data sets are included in experimental testing to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the system design
using realistic investigation examples. Finally, a conclusion is presented and future research areas are suggested.

IRD SCANNER DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A new bulk_extractor scanner plug-in was developed to perform automated detection and validation of
IRD numbers. This section outlines the development of an IRD number scanner, the output format of the IRD
scanner and the creation of a stoplist to remove false positive results present in default operating system
installations.
IRD Scanner Plug-in Development
The bulk_extractor tool was selected as the platform to aid tool development for the following reasons:





Designed specifically for digital forensic analysis
Supports a plug-in architecture to provide ease of software development
Provides optimistic decompression of compressed data
Open source software provides the ability to freely use, modify and redistribute

An IRD feature scanner plug-in (scan_ird.flex) was authored for bulk_extractor (version 1.4.0
revision 10884) using GNU Fast LEXical analyser (FLEX) programming language; a tool to generate C++
programs to perform complex textual search patterns. The IRD scanner has two main functions: 1) Extract
characters from the bulk_extractor stream buffer; and 2) Validate the extracted number. Similar to U.S.
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SSNs, IRD numbers do not have a standardised structure and may be encountered in a variety of patterns. Table
1 displays an overview of potential IRD number structures.
IRD Number Description IRD Number Structure Example
8 digits
NNNNNNNN
12345678
9 digits
NNNNNNNNN
123456789
8 digits with space delimiter NN NNN NNN
12 345 678
8 digits with dash delimiter NN-NNN-NNN
12-345-678
9 digits with space delimiter NNN NNN NNN
123 465 789
9 digits with dash delimiter NNN-NNN-NNN
123-456-789
Table 1: Overview of possible IRD number structures with examples (Inland Revenue, 2015).
The IRD scanner was designed and implemented to include the six potential IRD number structures displayed in
Table 1. To perform automated detection of potentially valid IRD numbers, six FLEX search patterns were
authored. Figure 1 displays an example of one IRD number scanner rule to detect an 8 digit number separated
with a dash delimiter.
DELIM
START8
BLOCK

([-])
[0-9]{2}
[0-9]{3}

[^0-9]{START8}{DELIM}{BLOCK}{DELIM}{BLOCK} {
/* Number structure: NN-NNN-NNN */
/* IRD scanner processing code goes here */
}
Figure 1: Example of a FLEX scanner rule to detect a potential IRD number.
As stated earlier, credit card numbers can be validated using the Luhn algorithm, also known as the modulus 10
algorithm. IRD numbers have a very similar validation model which uses the modulus 11 algorithm (Inland
Revenue, 2015). Furthermore, an IRD number must be within the following range: 10,000,000 and 150,000,000.
This results in 140 million possible numbers of which approximately only 13.8 million are valid. Using the
validation algorithm, an 8 or 9 digit number can be processed, validated and included in scanner results. Any 8
or 9 digit number that does not validate is discarded. Figure 2 displays an overview of the IRD number
validation process implemented in the scanner plug-in.

Potential IRD number

Is the number
between 10million
and 150million?

Yes

Remove last digit
from potential IRD
number

Perform modulus 11
algorithm

Is the remainder the
same as the last digit?
Yes
No

No

Invalid IRD number

Valid IRD number

Figure 2: Overview of IRD number validation technique (Inland Revenue, 2015).
IRD Scanner Plug-in Output
Once the target data set has been processed the bulk_extractor tool produces three different output files for
the IRD scanner: 1) A feature file; 2) A histogram file; and 3) A stoplist feature file. According to Bradley &
Garfinkel (2015) the feature file is a tab-delimited text file that contains the offset where the feature was found,
the feature itself (in this case the IRD number) and a configurable number of bytes that precede and follow the
feature (referred to as the feature context). Figure 3 displays a snippet of a populated IRD feature file.
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# BULK_EXTRACTOR-Version: 1.4.0 ($Rev: 10844 $)
# Feature-Recorder: ird
# Filename: /media/forensic/HDD/WindowsTestHDD.001
# Feature-File-Version: 1.1
107594013
112233445
plugininstaller_1122334455667788_6.1.7600
107598558
80-137-249
llageGST Reg No:80-137-2494B Titoki Place
107598608
76264279
id: {l:16 b:a04b76264279d00118000000cc02
107618283
22-220-616
N<BR>IRD no.<BR>22-220-616 <BR>Tax Code \x0D\x0A

Figure 3: Example of a feature file output from the IRD scanner.
A stoplist feature file is presented in the same format and is populated with IRD numbers that have been deemed
irrelevant as they appear in the specified stoplist. Documentation of excluded features is an important function to
have later access to if required.
Stoplist Implementation
Baier & Breitinger (2011) state that blacklists are a document or database that contain known content which are
used to filter irrelevant results. For example, a blacklist may contain a collection of known illicit material that is
represented by file names and cryptographic hash values. A bulk_extractor stoplist operates on a very
similar principle. The bulk_extractor tool implements a novel blacklisting technique called contextsensitive stoplists which only filter a feature if it appears in exactly the same context of a known operating
system file (Garfinkel, 2013). Stoplists are important as they perform data reduction, therefore, decreasing the
amount of information that requires further analysis.
A stoplist was generated by performing a fresh default installation of various Microsoft Windows operating
systems in a Virtual Machine (VM) testing environment. Multiple VMs were created using a variety of operating
systems installed with default options. The VM disk was forensically imaged using FTK Imager and then
processed using the IRD scanner. This resulted in a feature file of known IRD numbers for each default
operating system install. All feature files were processed and the feature (IRD number) and feature context
extracted and then populated in a master stoplist (ird_stoplist.txt). The stoplist can be included when
running bulk_extractor by specifying the -w argument and the stoplist file name. The following Windows
operating systems were selected for stoplist generation (all systems were 32-bit unless stated):







MSDOS622
Windows 3.1
Windows 95
Windows 98
Windows ME
Windows 2000








Windows NT 4.0
Windows XP (32 bit)
Windows XP (64 bit)
Windows Server 2003
Windows Vista
Windows 7 (32 bit)






Windows 7 (64 bit)
Windows 8
Windows 8.1
Windows 10

Post-processing IRD Scanner Output
Post-processing involves performing additional forensic analysis of the IRD scanner output. The
bulk_extractor tool implements stream-based forensic analysis and therefore, provides no information
regarding file system content. A framework was developed to perform a variety of post-processing tasks to help
identify data files that contain validated and forensically interesting IRD numbers. The implemented framework
is comprised of the following phases:




Determine the data file associated with each detected and validated feature
For each feature, search the feature context using keywords
Extract files that contain search hits

Determining the data files associated with the identified IRD numbers was achieved by processing the IRD
feature file using the identify_filenames.py script. This process produces an annotated feature file
which appends the logical file system location for each feature. A post-processing script
(ird_search_context.py) was authored to parse and search the annotated feature file. Each feature
context was extracted and a keyword search performed to identify potentially interesting IRD numbers. The
following keywords were used: 1) IRD; and 2) GST. The 'GST' keyword was included because a company’s IRD
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number is the same as that used for GST purposes. For each feature with a matching keyword, the feature was
extracted for an investigator to perform manual analysis.

KNOWN DATA SET TESTING
The first data set used for experimental testing was an authored realistic computer system with known content.
The data set was populated with a variety of common file types populated with known valid IRD numbers. This
section discusses the data set generation method and results obtained.
Data Set Generation
The creation of a known data set was accomplished by implementing a Virtual Machine (VM) testing
environment using the VirtualBox software. The VM was installed with Microsoft Windows 7 32-bit using
default installation options. VirtualBox Guest Additions were installed and a shared folder was created to
copy data to the guest system. A forensic image of the VM was collected using FTK Imager and then used to
create an IRD stoplist using the IRD scanner and implementing the resultant feature file as a stoplist.
A collection of common document formats (DOC, DOCX, XLS, XLSX, RTF and PDF) were authored using a
variety of Microsoft Office versions on Windows and Apple OS X. A selection of text encodings and PDF
printing methods were implemented to ensure scanner effectiveness. A collection of folders and archive files
were also created. This resulted in a total of 24 files. Each file created had a valid IRD number inserted to
provide ground truth data. The known data was copied to the VM by using the shared folder functionality. To
ensure the data files were copied correctly a Message Digest version 5 (MD5) hash value was calculated before
and after transfer. The final stage in data set generation was to create a forensic image of the VM using FTK
Imager.
Known Data Set Results
The known data set was processed using the IRD scanner, firstly without the stoplist and then together with the
stoplist. The known data set was also processed using the strings and grep utilities, at first without any
validation and then with IRD number validation. Table 2 displays an overview of results from known data set
testing for the four different forensic analysis approaches.
IRD Number
Total Found
Total Stopped
Percentage
Extraction Method
Stopped
Strings and grep
290,772
N/A
N/A
with no validation
IRD Scanner
21,616
0
0%
Strings and grep
10,904
N/A
N/A
with validation
IRD Scanner with
62
21,554
99.71%
blacklist
Table 2: IRD Scanner VS Strings and Grep: Overview of IRD number structures found in the known data set.
A very high number of potential IRD numbers were found by strings and grep (approximately 300,000) as
this method did not perform IRD number validation. In comparison, the IRD scanner without a stoplist
discovered approximately 21,000 validated IRD numbers. This result demonstrates the effectiveness of IRD
number validation. Testing with strings and grep including IRD number validation detected approximately
11,000 validated IRD numbers. This was lower than the IRD scanner (with validation) due to the capability of
the bulk_extractor tool to decompress data during processing, thus, resulting in more search hits. The
strings and grep tools cannot perform any decompression. Finally, the IRD scanner with a stoplist proved
the most effective technique which discovered a total of 62 validated IRD numbers. The stoplist proved very
effective by removing 99.71% of potential IRD numbers. These IRD numbers were filtered as they are known to
reside in operating system files from a default installation. Of the 62 identified numbers, 24 were true positives
from the known data set. The remainder (38 IRD numbers) were manually classified as false positives. In
summary, the results from the IRD scanner with an authored stoplist proved effective at identifying the correct
IRD numbers from the known data set while dramatically reducing false positive matches.
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REAL WORLD DATA SET TESTING
Real world data testing involved evaluating the IRD scanner on a variety of hard drives purchased on the secondhand market. This section presents an overview of the real world data set, experimental testing results using the
authored IRD scanner and findings achieved by performing post-processing of scanner output.
Data Set Overview
Real world data set testing for computer forensic tool development and testing is advantageous due to data
diversity and unpredictability, thereby, providing more robust research findings (Garfinkel et al., 2009). The real
world data set used for this testing was from second-hand hard drives primarily sourced from the New Zealand
TradeMe auction website. This provided a useful testing data set as the hard drives would most likely have NZ
IRD numbers. A total of 77 hard drives were sourced from Roberts (2013) and an additional 75 were purchased
for this research. Attempts were made to forensically image all of the 152 hard drives. However, only 122 were
able to be read, resulting in a total of 122 forensic images applicable for real world data set testing.
Real World Data Set Results
The total of 122 forensic images were processed using the bulk_extractor tool and specifying the IRD
scanner plug-in. Processing revealed that only 92 of the forensic images had data, the remainder (30 forensic
images) had previously been sanitised (overwritten with zeroes). The 92 forensic images equated approximately
3.29 Terabytes of raw data. Table 3 displays a total count of the detected features (IRD numbers), a total count of
features filtering using the stoplist and the percentage of stopped features.
IRD Number Description Total Features Relevant Features Stopped Features Percentage Stopped
8 digits
8,625,477
8,315,957
309,520
3.59%
9 digits
7,590,536
6,663,180
927,356
12.22%
8 digits with dash delimiter
148,032
148,012
20
0.01%
8 digits with space delimiter
242,043
238,882
3,161
1.31%
9 digits with dash delimiter
4,687
2,359
2,328
49.67%
9 digits with space delimiter
83,090
82,651
439
0.53%
16,693,865
15,451,041
1,242,824
7.44%
Total
Table 3: Overview of IRD number structures found in the real world data set.
The results obtained from real world testing illustrate the variability of tool performance on real data. Even with
a master stoplist comprised of 16 default operating system installations there was an overwhelming number of
detected and validated IRD numbers; a total of approximately 17 million. This is a formidable number of search
hits for a practitioner to manually analyse. Approximately 1 million IRD numbers were filtered using the
stoplist, this being approximately 7% of all detected features. However, the stoplist did prove more effective on a
small number of hard drives, filtering over 60% of all detected IRD numbers on six different hard drives. Further
processing is essential to identify IRD numbers of interest and to reduce manual analysis.
Post-processing was thus performed on the results from the IRD scanner in an attempt to identify true positive
IRD numbers of forensic interest. The post-processing framework was executed on each forensic image,
specifically the feature file output (see Figure 3 for an example). The feature context, the data immediately
surrounding the detected IRD number (default of 16 bytes either side), was searched using ‘IRD’ and ‘GST’ as
keywords. The technique processes previously detected and validated IRD numbers and attempts to find IRD
numbers with a recognisable prefix (e.g., IRD Number: NNN-NNN-NNN). Post-processing resulted in a
dramatic reduction in IRD numbers deemed to be relevant. Table 4 displays a summary of search hits found. It
includes the total number of keyword hits and whether the IRD number was found in an allocated file or
unallocated space.
Search Term Keyword Hit Allocated File Unallocated File
IRD
172
37
135
GST
5,528
755
4,773
5,700
792
4,908
Total
Table 4: Overview of feature context search results from the real world data set.
The post-processing keyword search proved effective in identifying IRD numbers of potential interest. A total of
5,700 IRD numbers were identified. Of these, a total of 792 allocated files were identified and extracted
including: Microsoft Word and Excel documents, PDF files, Lotus Notes database files, CSV files, Outlook
Express files and Exchange Server EDB files. The post-processing searching technique found IRD numbers
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stored in all six specified number structures (see Table 1). An important finding was that a wide variety of IRD
number prefixes were discovered, as illustrated in the following examples identified from testing output:





IRD
IRD No
IRD No is
GST






GST Number
GST No
GST#
GST REG No

The prefix examples above were also found in a variety of conventions including: all upper-case, all lower-case,
sentence case, with or without colons and a variety of spacing between the keyword and actual IRD number. The
variety of prefix conventions make incorporating potential IRD number prefixes into the scanner exceptionally
difficult. However, this highlights the effectiveness and flexibility of performing keyword searching on
previously validated IRD numbers using feature context searching.

CONCLUSION
This research has contributed to the forensic analysis techniques used to detect and validate IRD numbers. A
system was designed and implemented by authoring a scanner plug-in for the bulk_extractor tool. The
IRD scanner was evaluated against known content and real world data sets to determine effectiveness. A novel
post-processing search technique was implemented by searching the IRD number context (data before and after
the detected and validated IRD number) which proved effective at performing data reduction of irrelevant
results, reporting only forensically interesting results to the investigator.
Forensic analysis and detection of PII remains an active research area. Additional research and testing to detect
and validate other important personal information such as bank account numbers, driver’s license numbers,
passport numbers and telephone numbers would prove useful to digital forensic practitioners in countries where
techniques and tools are limited and not verified.
Resource Availability
To aid future research and development the IRD scanner plug-in, the master stoplist and post-processing
framework have been made available and hosted on the authors GitHub repository: https://github.com/geehe732
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